Editor's Note to "Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices"

Zwangshandlungen Und Religionsübungen

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(a) German Editions:
1907 Z. Religionspsychol., 1 (1) [April], 4-12.
1924 G.S., 10, 210-20.
(b) English Translation:
The present translation, with a slightly changed title, is a modified version of the one published in 1924.

This paper was written in February, 1907, for the first issue of a periodical directed by Bresler and Vorbrodt. At a meeting of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on February 27, Freud reported that he had sent in a contribution and also that Bresler had invited him to be a co-editor and that he had accepted. His name in fact appears in the (rather long) list of editorial advisers. The incorrect statement that the paper was read to the Society by Freud on March 2 is derived from Jones's biography (2, 380). March 2 was in any case a Saturday and not a Wednesday. Jung was present at the meeting on March 6, when Adler read a case history. (See the Minutes, 1.) This was Freud's introductory incursion into the psychology of religion, and, as he points out in Section V of his ‘Short Account of Psycho-Analysis' (1924f), it formed a definite step towards his much extended treatment of the subject five years later in Totem and Taboo. But besides this the paper is of great interest as being Freud's first discussion of obsessional neurosis since the Breuer period some ten years earlier. He here gives a sketch of the mechanism of obsessional symptoms which he was to elaborate in the case history of the 'Rat Man' (1909d), whose treatment, however, he had not begun when he wrote the present work.

Section Citation


I AM certainly not the first person to have been struck by the resemblance between what are called obsessive actions in sufferers from nervous affections and the observances by means of which believers give expression to their piety. The term ‘ceremonial', which has been applied to some of these obsessive actions, is evidence of this. The resemblance, however, seems to me to be more than a superficial one, so that an insight into the origin of neurotic ceremonial may embolden us to draw inferences by analogy about the psychological processes of religious life.

People who carry out obsessive actions or ceremonials belong to the same class as those who suffer from obsessive thinking, obsessive ideas, obsessive impulses and the like. Taken together, these form a particular clinical entity, to which the name of ‘obsessional neurosis' ['Zwangsnervose'] is customarily applied.1 But one should not attempt to deduce the character of the illness from its name; for, strictly speaking, other kinds of morbid mental phenomena have an equal claim to possessing what are spoken of as ‘obsessional' characteristics. In place of a definition we must for the time being be content with obtaining a detailed knowledge of these states, since we have not yet been able to arrive at a criterion of obsessional neuroses; it probably lies very deep, although we seem to sense its presence everywhere in the manifestations of the illness.

Neurotic ceremonials consist in making small adjustments

1 See Löwenfeld (1904). [According to that author (Standard Ed., 8) the term ‘Zwangsvorstellung' (‘obsessional idea' or simply ‘obsession') was introduced by Krafft-Ebing in 1867. The concept (and the term) ‘obsessional neurosis' originated (on the same authority, Standard Ed., 296 and 487) from Freud himself. His first published use of it was in his first paper on anxiety neurosis (1895b). It occurs in a letter to Fliess of
to particular everyday actions, small additions or restrictions or arrangements, which have always to be carried out in the same, or in a methodically varied, manner. These activities give the impression of being mere formalities, and they seem quite meaningless to us. Nor do they appear otherwise to the patient himself; yet he is incapable of giving them up, for any deviation from the ceremonial is visited by intolerable anxiety, which obliges him at once to make his omission good. Just as trivial as the ceremonial actions themselves are the occasions and activities which are embellished, encumbered and in any case prolonged by the ceremonial—for instance, dressing and undressing, going to bed or satisfying bodily needs. The performance of a ceremonial can be described by replacing it, as it were, by a series of unwritten laws. For instance, to take the case of the bed ceremonial: the chair must stand in a particular place beside the bed; the clothes must lie upon it folded in a particular order; the blanket must be tucked in at the bottom and the sheet smoothed out; the pillows must be arranged in such and such a manner, and the subject’s own body must lie in a precisely defined position. Only after all this may he go to sleep. Thus in slight cases the ceremonial seems to be no more than an exaggeration of an orderly procedure that is customary and justifiable; but the special conscientiousness with which it is carried out and the anxiety which follows upon its neglect stamp the ceremonial as a ‘sacred act’. Any interruption of it is for the most part badly tolerated, and the presence of other people during its performance is almost always ruled out.

Any activities whatever may become obsessive actions in the wider sense of the term if they are elaborated by small additions or given a characteristic by means of pauses and repetitions. We shall not expect to find a sharp distinction between ‘ceremonials’ and ‘obsessive actions’. As a rule obsessive actions have grown out of ceremonials. Besides these two, prohibitions and hindrances (abulia) make up the content of the disorder; these, in fact, only continue the work of the obsessive actions, inasmuch as some things are completely forbidden to the patient and others only allowed subject to his following a prescribed ceremonial.

It is remarkable that both compulsions and prohibitions (having to do something and having not to do something) apply in the first instance only to the subject’s solitary activities and for a long time leave his social behaviour unaffected. Sufferers from this illness are consequently able to treat their affliction as a private matter and keep it concealed for many years. And, indeed, many more people suffer from these forms of obsessional neurosis than doctors hear of. For many sufferers, too, concealment is made easier from the fact that they are quite well able to fulfill their social duties during a part of the day, once they have devoted a number of hours to their secret doings, hidden from view like Mélusine.¹

It is easy to see where the resemblances lie between neurotic ceremonials and the sacred acts of religious ritual: in the qualms of conscience brought on by their neglect, in their complete isolation from all other actions (shown in the prohibition against interruption) and in the conscientiousness with which they are carried out in every detail. But the differences are equally obvious, and a few of them are so glaring that they make the comparison a sacrifice: the greater individual variability of [neurotic] ceremonial actions in contrast to the stereotyped character of rituals (prayer, turning to the East, etc.), their private nature as opposed to the public and communal character of religious observances, above all, however, the fact that, while the minutiae of religious ceremonial are full of significance and have a symbolic meaning, those of neurotics seem foolish and senseless. In this respect an obsessional neurosis presents a travesty, half comic and half tragic, of a private religion. But it is precisely this sharpest difference between neurotic and religious ceremonial which disappears when, with the help of the psycho-analytic technique of investigation, one penetrates

¹ [A beautiful woman in mediaeval legend, who led a secret existence as a water-nymph.]

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In the course of such an investigation the appearance which obsessive actions afford of being foolish and senseless is completely effaced, and the reason for their having that appearance is explained. It is found that the obsessive actions are perfectly significant in every detail, that they serve important interests of the personality and that they give expression to experiences that are still operative and to thoughts that are casted with affect. They do this in two ways, either by direct or by symbolic representation; and they are consequently to be interpreted either historically or symbolically.

I must give a few examples to illustrate my point. Those who are familiar with the findings of psycho-analytic investigation into the psychoneuroses will not be surprised to learn that what is being represented in obsessive actions or in ceremonials is derived from the most intimate, and for the most part from the sexual, experiences of the patient.

(a) A girl whom I was able to observe was under a compulsion to rinse round her wash-basin several times after washing. The significance of this ceremonial action lay in the proverbial saying: ‘Don’t throw away dirty water till you have clean.’ Her action was intended to give a warning to her sister, of whom she was very fond, and to restrain her from getting divorced from her unsatisfactory husband until she had established a relationship with a better man.

(b) A woman who was living apart from her husband was subject to a compulsion, whenever she ate anything, to leave
bring them into effect. We may say that the sufferer from compulsions and prohibitions behaves as if
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being short of small change, she asked him to change a five-kronen1 piece for her. He did so, pocketed the large
coin and declared with a gallant air that he would never part with it, since it had passed through her hands. At their
later meetings she was frequently tempted to challenge him to show her the five-kronen piece, as though she wanted to
convince herself that she could believe in his intentions. But she refrained, for the good reason that it is impossible to
distinguish between coins of the same value. Thus her doubt remained unresolved; and it left her with the compulsion
to write down the number of each bank-note, by which it can be distinguished from all others of the same value.2

These few examples, selected from the great number I have met with, are merely intended to illustrate my assertion that in
obsessive actions everything has its meaning and can be interpreted. The same is true of ceremonials in the strict sense, only that the
evidence for this would require a more circumstantial presentation. I am quite aware of how far our explanations of obsessive
actions are apparently taking us from the sphere of religious thought.

It is one of the conditions of the illness that the person who is obeying a compulsion carries it out without understanding its
meaning—or at any rate its chief meaning. It is only thanks to the efforts of psycho-analytic treatment that he becomes conscious of
the meaning of his obsessive action and, with it, of the motives that are impelling him to it. We express this important fact by
saying that the obsessive action serves to express unconscious motives and ideas. In this, we seem to find a further departure
from religious practices; but we must remember that as a rule the ordinary pious individual, too, performs a ceremonial without
concerning himself with its significance, although priests and scientific investigators may be familiar with the—mostly symbolic
meaning of the ritual. In all believers, however, the motives which impel

1 See the collection of my shorter papers on the theory of the neuroses published in 1906 [Standard Ed. 3].

1 [In German 'Tisch und Belt' ('table and bed'). Cf. a paper on fairy tales in dreams (1913d), Standard Ed., 12, 282, footnote 3.]

2 [Freud discussed this case again (with reference to the obsessive action described in (d) above) at considerable length in Lecture XVII of his
Introductory Lectures (1916-17).]
sense of guilt, of which, however, he knows nothing, so that we must call it an unconscious sense of guilt, in spite of the apparent contradiction in terms.¹ This sense of guilt has its source in certain early mental events, but it is constantly being revived by renewed temptations which arise whenever there is a contemporary provocation. Moreover, it occasions a lurking sense of expectant anxiety, an expectation of misfortune, which is linked, through the idea of punishment, with the internal perception of the temptation. When the ceremonial is first being constructed, the patient is still conscious that he must do this or that lest some ill should befall, and as a rule the nature of the ill that is to be expected is still known to his consciousness. But what is already hidden from him is the connection—which is always demonstrable—between the occasion on which this expectant anxiety arises and the danger which it conjures up. Thus a ceremonial starts as an action for defence or insurance, a protective measure.

The sense of guilt of obsessional neurotics finds its counterpart in the protestations of pious people that they know that at heart they are miserable sinners; and the pious observances (such as prayers, invocations, etc.,) with which such people preface every daily act, and in especial every unusual undertaking, seem to have the value of defensive or protective measures.

A deeper insight into the mechanism of obsessional neurosis is gained if we take into account the primary fact which lies at the bottom of it. This is always the repression of an instinctual impulse¹ (a component of the sexual instinct) which was present in the subject's constitution and which was allowed to find expression for a while during his childhood but later succumbed to suppression. In the course of the repression of this instinct a special conscientiousness is created which is directed against the instinct's aims; but this psychical reaction-formation feels insecure and constantly threatened by the instinct which is lurking in the unconscious. The influence of the repressed instinct is felt as a temptation, and during the process of repression itself anxiety is generated, which gains control over the future in the form of expectant anxiety. The process of repression which leads to obsessional neurosis must be considered as one which is only partly successful and which increasingly threatens to fail. It may thus be compared to an unending conflict; fresh psychical efforts are continually required to counterbalance the forward pressure of the instinct.² Thus the ceremonial and obsessive actions arise partly as a defence against the temptation and partly as a protection against the ill which is expected. Against the temptation the protective measures seem soon to become inadequate; then the prohibitions come into play, with the purpose of keeping at a distance situations that give rise to temptation. Prohibitions take the place of obsessive actions, it will be seen, just as a phobia is designed to avert a hysterical attack. Again, a ceremonial represents the sum of the conditions subject to which something that is not yet absolutely forbidden is permitted, just as the Church's marriage ceremony signifies for the believer a sanctioning of sexual enjoyment which would otherwise be sinful. A further characteristic of obsessional neurosis, as of all similar affections, is that its manifestations (its symptoms, including the obsessive actions) fulfil the condition of being a compromise between the warring forces of the mind. They thus always reproduce something of the pleasure which they are designed to prevent; they serve the repressed instinct no less than the agencies which are repressing it. As the illness progresses, indeed, actions which were originally mostly concerned with maintaining the defence come to approximate more and more to the proscribed actions through which the instinct was able to find expression in childhood.

Some features of this state of affairs may be seen in the sphere of religious life as well. The formation of a religion, too, seems to be based on the suppression, the renunciation, of certain instinctual impulses. These impulses, however, are not, as in the neuroses, exclusively components of the sexual instinct; they are self-seeking, socially harmful instincts, though, even so, they are usually not without a sexual component. A sense of guilt following upon continual temptation and an expectant anxiety in the form of fear of divine punishment have, after all, been familiar to us in the field of religion longer than in that of neurosis. Perhaps because of the admixture of sexual components, perhaps because of some general characteristics of the instincts, the suppression of instinct proves to be an inadequate and interminable process in religious life also. Indeed, complete backslidings into sin are more common among pious people than among neurotics and these give rise to a new form of religious activity, namely acts of penance, which have their counterpart in obsessional neurosis.

We have noted as a curious and derogatory characteristic of obsessional neurosis that its ceremonials are concerned with the small actions of daily life and are expressed in foolish regulations and restrictions in connection with them. We cannot understand this remarkable feature of the clinical

¹ [The German word used here for 'sense of guilt' is 'Schuldbewusstsein', literally 'consciousness of guilt'.—This seems to be the earliest explicit appearance of the 'unconscious sense of guilt' which was to play such an important part in Freud's later writings—e.g. at the beginning of the last chapter of The Ego and the Id (1923b). The way had been prepared for the notion, however, very much earlier, in Section II of the first paper on 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1894a).]

² ['Triebregung.' This appears to be Freud's first published use of what was to be one of his most used terms.]
picture until we have realized that the mechanism of psychical displacement, which was first discovered by me in the construction of dreams, dominates the mental processes of obsessional neurosis. It is already clear from the few examples of obsessive actions given above that their symbolism and the detail of their execution are brought about by a displacement from the actual, important thing on to a small one which takes its place—for instance, from a husband on to a chair. It is this tendency to displacement which progressively changes the clinical picture and eventually succeeds in turning what is apparently the most trivial matter into something of the utmost importance and urgency. It cannot be denied that in the religious field as well there is a similar tendency to a displacement of psychical values, and in the same direction, so that the petty ceremonials of religious practice gradually become the essential thing and push aside the underlying thoughts. That is why religions are subject to reforms which work retroactively and aim at a re-establishment of the original balance of values.

The character of compromise which obsessive actions possess in their capacity as neurotic symptoms is the character least easily detected in corresponding religious observances. Yet here, too, one is reminded of this feature of neuroses when one remembers how commonly all the acts which religion forbids—the expressions of the instincts it has suppressed—are committed precisely in the name of, and ostensibly for the sake of, religion.

In view of these similarities and analogies one might venture to regard obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart of the formation of a religion, and to describe that neurosis as an individual religiosity and religion as a

universal obsessional neurosis. The most essential similarity would reside in the underlying renunciation of the activation of instincts that are constitutionally present; and the chief difference would lie in the nature of those instincts, which in the neurosis are exclusively sexual in their origin, while in religion they spring from egoistic sources.

A progressive renunciation of constitutional instincts, whose activation might afford the ego primary pleasure, appears to be one of the foundations of the development of human civilization. Some part of this instinctual repression is effected by its religions, in that they require the individual to sacrifice his instinctual pleasure to the Deity: 'Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord.' In the development of the ancient religions one seems to discern that many things which mankind had renounced as 'iniquities' had been surrendered to the Deity and were still permitted in his name, so that the handing over to him of bad and socially harmful instincts was the means by which man freed himself from their domination. For this reason, it is surely no accident that all the attributes of man, along with the misdeeds that follow from them, were to an unlimited amount ascribed to the ancient gods. Nor is it a contradiction of this that nevertheless man was not permitted to justify his own iniquities by appealing to divine example.

VIENNA, February 1907

1 See The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Chapter VI, Section B [Standard Ed., 4, 305 ff.].

2 [Freud had already described this mechanism in his book on jokes (1905c), near the end of Section 11 of Chapter II. He often recurred to the point—for instance, in the 'Rat Man' analysis (1909d), Standard Ed., 10, 241, and in the metapsychological paper on repression (1915d), Standard Ed., 14, 157.]

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